Abstract. -This article traces how philosophers writing in Spanish lands in America reflected upon their own work. In the 16th century, concerns were pedagogical, in the 17th, a sense of American identity emerged, and in the 18th, new attitudes toward Europe developed which are more akin to later Latin American thought. The study shows how the logic and ontology of the Siglo de Oro (16th-17th centuries) resemble current interests in philosophy, describes an extraordinary "defense of intellectual America" by 17th-century Peruvians, and discusses the impact of Modernity. The first part of this article treats of 16th-century Mexico, and the second (to appear in the Jahrbuch next year) will cover the 17th and 18th centuries (including the Latin texts of a "Defensio ingenii Americani").
European philosophy was practiced in Latin America from the early 16th century and consisted of two general paradigms: Scholasticism and Modernity.
1 Modern philosophy, science and mathematics from Europe made a strong impact -on Scholastic thinkers as well -especially from the middle of the 18th century, well before the movements of independence from Spain and Portugal in the early 19th century. Hence, we can speak of a "pure" or "pre-modern" Scholasticism, which was practically unaffected by Modernity and flourished during the Siglo de Oro of the 16th and 17th centuries, and later "modernized" varieties that reacted to various degrees and in different ways to the new thinking.
were reevaluated positively, and now there is an appreciation of the philosophical relevance and technical merit of Siglo de Oro Scholastics. The chief criticism at the first stage has been that Scholastic philosophy lagged behind Europe. Typical epithets were "obsolete", "backward", "decadent", "unoriginal", "sacristanesque" and "ergoistic". The second stage was represented by a series of valuable works published in mid-twentieth century on the penetration of European modern philosophy and science into Latin American academic life. 7 These historians corrected the previous view by showing that the "lag" of eighteenth-century academics behind European Modernity was exaggerated. 8 The key criterion of these first two stages centered around whether, how and when thinkers in America responded to European innovation. 9 Today, in Iberia and Iberoamerica there are many studies and translations of pre-modern Scholastic works, especially of logic.
10 Although these scholars are not particularly concerned to track the reception of European doctrines, they have also dispelled the "lag" myth as far as pre-modern Scholasticism is concerned. Juan de Espinosa Medrano, a philosopher working in Cuzco (to whom we shall refer below), was not untypical. In his logic (c.1688) he quoted more works 355 Self-Awareness in Colonial Latin American Philosophy 7 Examples are Bernabé Navarro, La introducción de la filosofía moderna en Mé-xico (Mexico City 1948) and John Tate Lanning, Academic Culture in the Spanish Colonies (Oxford 1940) and idem, The Eighteenth-Century Enlightenment in the University of San Carlos de Guatemala (Ithaca 1956) . 8 "Instead of having a cultural lag of three hundred years behind Europe, there was a hiatus in the Spanish colonies of approximately one generation from European innovator to American academicians [... and] as the eighteenth century passed, the gap became less and less." Lanning, Academic Culture (note 7), p. 85; "Guatemalan students in 1785 had an infinitely more varied and adequate grasp of the problems of the learned world than any scientist with teaching experience would expect of undergraduates today." Idem, The Eighteenth-Century (note 7), p. 115. 9 A fruitful method of tracing the inroads of Modernity was finding names or typical doctrines of modern philosophers in colonial works, especially "tesarios" or examination "theses" (Lanning).
from his own century than from any other, including at least fifteen published in Europe after his birth (c.1632) and five after 1650. 11 My sources are prefatory materials (forewords, dedications, authorizations) from the following works. Three logics from 16th century New Spain: by Alonso Gutiérrez de la Vera Cruz (Mexico), Tomás Mercado (Mexico and Seville), and Antonio Rubio (Mexico and Alcalá).
12 Works by Americans in the Viceroyalty of Peru during the 17th-century: logics by Jerónimo de Valera (Lima) and Juan de Espinosa Medrano (Cuzco), and a theological work by the Chilean Alfonso Briceño (bishop in Nicaragua and Venezuela).
13 I will also refer to the "modern" philosophy courses of the Spaniards Isidoro de Celis (Lima) and Juan Benito Díaz de Gamarra y Dávalos (Mexico).
14
The typical philosophical works of the time were the "commentary" and, in the 17th century, the cursus philosophicus, containing the core matter of logic, "physics" or natural philosophy, and metaphysics (in the 18th century, "modern" subjects were added). Two logic courses were taught: formal logic, called the "lesser" logic or "summulae", and the "greater" logic or "dialectics", 15 which dealt with a series of logical, metaphysical and epistemological issues.
These works were classroom textbooks, but they also served as the primary means of communication among the professors themselves (this twofold purpose was indeed a source of conflict, as we shall see). The intellectual atmosphere is revealed by the prefaces wherein authors explained their aims and by the "commendations" their supporters wrote to "advertise" the works. Logical works are especially important since they are more numerous; most philosophers who published on logic did not manage to get the rest of their course into print (for example, of the logics mentioned here only one forms part of a complete course).
THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY; THE VICEROYALTY OF NEW SPAIN
The introductory material we have analyzed shows that in the 16th century reflection on doing philosophy was mainly concerned with teaching. The writers were involved of course in the "practical" affairs of America, but these did not ordinarily intrude upon their academic philosophy. This is also true of Antonio Rubio, but in his case a conflict was perceived between writing and teaching "there" and "here": in New Spain and in Old Spain.
Alonso de la Vera Cruz 17
Alonso received his doctorate and taught philosophy briefly at the University of Salamanca before sailing to Mexico where he entered 357 Self-Awareness in Colonial Latin American Philosophy the Augustinian Order. He learned Purépecha, the language of the Tarascan Indians, and gave the first philosophy courses on the American continent in Tiripitío, Michoacán; later, he taught at the recently founded University of Mexico. His lesser and greater logics were the first philosophy books printed in America. During a short interval in Spain, he revised his works for further editions, then returned to Mexico for the remainder of his life.
The immediate origin of Iberian and Iberoamerican logic was the restoration of the nominalists at the University of Paris in 1481. A number of Spaniards studied there and upon returning to Spain after the turn of the century initiated a program of rigorous logical analysis, especially at the Universities of Alcalá and Salamanca, with publications in the first third of the century.
18 These masters were soon attacked by humanists and other philosophers for their "nonsense" (nugae), the supposed extravagance and barbarity of their "useless questions", 19 and at mid century, logic teachers themselves -some, like the Spaniard D. Soto, "repenting" of their former pedagogical sins -simplified and abridged their courses.
Friar Alonso was an enthusiastic member of this reform movement and he carried this logical "Golden Age", as he called it, this "Saturnian kingdom", to the New World. 20 He wrote his textbooks to prepare students for theology and other fields in the most efficient way. 21 Other teachers burdened their "tender minds" with logical puzzles, causing them to drop out and loathe this "useful, necessary subject".
22
"Who can read Encinas, this 'Oak without acorns', and others of his ilk without getting angry? Who can use them in logic? After carefully studying them for many months, even years, we can but say: 'Master, we have toiled the whole night through and caught nothing'".
23
He spoke from personal experience, he said, and regretted his youthful labors: "stretching forth my hand I found aught but time lost".
24
He avoided this "labyrinth" 25 himself and listed others who did the same.
26 These reformists preferred the "old" approach of Aristotle and Rudolf Agricola to the "newly invented" Scholastic logic developed by previous Iberian logicians. 27 His own practice proved that logic could be taught in a way surpassing all expectations. 23 "Quis poterit absque bili 'Encinam-sine-Glandibus' ceterosque hujus classis viros legere vel in arte dialectica eis uti? Quos ad menses multos, immo ad annos, si audias et diligenter, dicere poteris, 'Praeceptor, per totam noctem laborantes, nihil cepimus'". (PRS, 11A). Encina means "oak" in Spanish; the bilingual pun recalls Luke, 5:5; he also puns on cepimus, meaning "caught" and "understood".
24 "Expertus loquor, et doleo annos consumptos in istis sine fructu. Post exantlatos labores, post juventutis conatus, extendens manum nihil potui invenire nisi tempus irremediabile, deperditum". (PRS, 11A). "Considerabam enim animoque creberrime versabam quantum olim olei, somni, operaeque consumpserim (immo perdiderim), dum addiscerem caudatos illos syllogismos, oppositiones nulli pervias, ac id genus plurima, quae nimirum intellectum magis occupant et gravant quam poliunt, acuunt, et ornant. Plus nocent quam juvant atque conducunt. Et e quibus (ut tandem concludam) id solum frugis reportatur quod possimus oblivisci." (DRS).
25 "Et quidem, cum omnia Deus in pondere, numero, et mensura fecerit, si ipsi, fimbrias suas dilatantes, modum observare animo conciperent, a Daedali labyrintho essemus liberi". (PRS, 11A 27 "Rem igitur habens exploratissimam atque compertam, in votis habui ea omnia quae ad dialecticam spectant sic tradere ut, supervacaneis succissis atque vitatis, utilium et necessariorum nullum unquam cuicumque studioso subiret desiderium. Non quo nova adducamus, sed quo antiqua omnia ita in ordinem redegerimus ut brevissimo temporis curriculo juvenes possint ad maturam frugem pervenire".
(DRS). "[Titelmanus] ex
Recent studies in the history of logic temper these judgments. Scholastic logic contained the Aristotelian syllogistic but was actually far broader and more adequate. Logicians today may be intrigued by Alonso's examples of "nonsense": the use of quantifiers "c" and "d"; difficulties of ordinary language analysis, types of semantic reference, and dialogical logic. 29 And his boasts of "simplicity" should not deceive us. The technical difficulty of his books might astonish logic teachers today. His work on formal logic contains over 100,000 -Latin -words (hardly exceptional in his time), his style is unencumbered, dense, meticulous. And he made his students learn how to use the quantifiers "a" and "b" (if not "c" and "d"). 28 "Verum unum quod maxime nos movere debeat: experientia. Periculum enim fecimos (non solum semel atque iterum) tradentes discipulis nostris, in brevi consumentes tempora multa, scientiam ipsam attingentes, Theologiam in tantum profecerunt, ut hominum vincant spectationem. Quippe qui per latos campos spatiati in doctrina sancti Thomae, nil istarum naeniarum et sophismatum offendentes, evaserunt singulariter docti. Et in aperto est illa noviter adinventa dogmata non solum necessaria non fore ad veram sapientiam, sed potius, si non nociva, saltem nullius momenti. Quapropter, rationem habentes temporis et profectus discipulorum, solum Dei gloriam in hoc negotio spectantes, mediam tenendo viam regiamque, neque ad dexteram neque ad sinistram declinabimus". (PRS, 11B).
29 "Quid ad artem, obsecreo, in materia contradictoriarum, innumeros formare syllogismos impositiones, suppositiones adducere novas, simplices, mixtas, de ly 'c', de ly 'd', et confusas; quorsum consequentias de ly 'uterque' fingere? Etsi de exponibilibus fiat sermo, nullus tribulos et spinas, quos talis germinat terra, poterit sine pedis laesione pertransire". (PRS, 11B; "ly" means the following expression is taken for itself). See PRS quote, note 22. For dialogical logic (Scholastic "oppositiones"), see Paul Lorenzen, Metamathematik (Manheim 1962), and K. Lorenz, "Dialogspiele als semantische Grundlage von Logikkalkülen": Archiv für mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung 11, Resolutio summularum (Salamanca 1573), 36A, 36B, 38 and, 38B. For example, "homo est b animal" means x[Ax&"y[Hy>x=y]], where "A" signifies "animal" and "H" "homo"; it is true in case there is only one man and recalls our use of quantifiers to express numbers, "definite descriptions", etc. 
Tomás de Mercado 31
Mercado entered the Dominican Order in New Spain and received his masters degree in philosophy from the University of Mexico. He finished his studies at the University of Salamanca, then taught and published lesser and greater logics in Seville (making his own translations of Aristotle from the Greek). He left Spain for America but died from illness off the coast of Mexico.
Friar Tomás had misgivings about publishing his logic because he feared he would be called slothful if he followed in the ruts of others but presumptuous if he tried to be original. He chanced the latter course, relying on his teaching experience in several areas of philosophy and his knowledge of "our natural ability".
32
Like Vera Cruz, Mercado was a reformer in logic and complained of professors who so much darkened the portal of wisdom -logic was the first philosophy course in the curriculum -that only the cleverest 32 "Non paucos dies illa me suspensum cogitatio tenuit hujus aggrediendi laboris adeundique discriminis, quod plurimi ante me hanc facultatem tradiderunt, ejus commento operam impendentes, quorum eruditioni ac literaturae non modo re verum neque cogitatione conferendus essem; tantum abest illorum mihi multiplicem doctrinam arrogem et ostentem. Verebar multum ne otii pigritiaeve notarer si orbitam tot eruditiorum hominum quadragis conculcatam sectari concupiscerem, vel audaciae suggillarer si progredi altius tantisper contenderem quam ceteri longe doctiores progressi sunt. Mecum vero identidem volvens quam libenti animo viri illi gravissimi, aliis etiam amplioribus studiis intentissime addicti, artem dialecticam (qua summa potuere diligentia) suis lucubrationibus illustrare conati sunt, animos et vires ad scribendum assumpsi quae multorum dierum studio ex ipsius institutis exhausi. Quod sine objurgationis formidine facere non licere modo sed omnino expedire arbitror". (p. 1). "Quamobrem nemo nos merito temeritatis arguet si eodem animo quo majores nostri eandem molam rursus agitemus nostra manu ipsam levigantes, si forsan periculum facientes eam perfectam et aptam educere valeamus". (p. 3). "Et credo me non falli, adeo multo rerum usu et diutina experientia temporum quibus incessanter totius philosophiae institutoris officium exercui et sollerti satis hujus artis et nostri ingenii naturae consideratione id comperi". (Second prologue, 1rAB). students could stick it out 33 whereas most got frightened back into literature ("skill in language and rhetoric"). 34 Why terrorize young minds with complex distinctions and rules and "thousands of opinions, as many as heads"?
35 He resolved to stick to the essentials and omit the advanced logical material and the alien topics that other authors dragged in from the murkiest corners of philosophy.
36
Mercado thought the reason why such learned, cautious men could be such bad teachers was simply that they were afraid to go against the trend and risk the reproach of their "sophistical" colleagues. 37 Both he 34 "Virtus tam rara quam praeclara tamque paucis divinitus concessa ut plerique Scholasticorum in ipsis paene dialecticae incunabulis animo linquantur et ad id literarum genus regrediantur quae nil nisi folia et flosculos germinant, nempe linguarum peritiam et rhetorices phalerata ornamenta. Nec audent ad arcem philosophiae mirabilem transire, ubi rerum naturas ac proprietates comminus contemplentur divinaque, et utriusque teologiae arcana linceo melius intuspiciant, quarum alteram, 'mysticam' appellatam ab Mercurio Trimegisto et ab Horo Appolline, originem trahere memoriae prodiderunt, alteram ab Deo mentibus nostris infusam, qua ipsius ultra mundana cognitio comparantur, exploratissimum est". (p. 2). "Mystical" here is contrasted with "infused".
35 "Quid aliud vero, in re tan tenui et exili ut artium materia, tam ingens distinctionum congeries, tam innumerabilis regularum multiplicitas, tantus tamque vastus opinionum cumulus ut non 'quot capita tot sententiae' sed 'tot millia sententiarum,' nisi teneris et inassuetis juvenum mentibus spectra horribilia, larvas metuendas, lemures formidandos, ac denique phantasmata formidolosa objicere?" (p. 2).
36 "Quamobrem sanctio est constitutioque antiquitate veneranda (quam ab ipsamet sapientia emanasse non dubium est), ut institutores ac illius praemonstratores a notioribus quavis in arte primordia ducant. [...] [H]oc claritatis lacte tyrones nutriret donec ad validiores cibos mandendos essent vegetiores firmioresque. Lex ac norma docendi adeo recta, ut si ejus observantia postulet, quaedam silentio involvere quae obscure dicenda essent, sapientissime subticeantur. Nec brevitatis vitium incurremus, si brevitate et compendio conducibilius disciplina instituitur. [...] Quod nos discursibus rem perquirere nuncupamus". (p. 1-2). "Materies ex occultissimis atque abditissimis philosophiae arcanis accersita". (p. 4).
37 "Nam nostra errata atque defectus ita propatula sunt ut non illico appareant modo, sed et dicteriis ac scommatis irrideantur. Ut saepe diligenti animo expenderim cur viri adeo eruditi, ita providi et cauti in rebus tam perspicuis cespitarent. Et id solum causae inveni: nullum ante centum annos ausum ex sententia stili scribere et qua expediret methodo chartis scripta sua illinere, ne se sophistarum vulgo irridendum objiceret, malluisseque ipsorum libidini assentiri quam suam vel facultatem propugnare vel doctrinam and others, he said, came to regret having taught such "nonsense"; they can laugh at themselves now but pity their colleagues still entangled in it. 38 Again, much of Mercado's "nonsense" might intrigue logicians today. Paradoxes (insolubilia) are indeed "tangled snares", and they have been a key factor in the recent formulation of logic systems and set theory. 39 The "false rhapsodies" of quantifier letters "aaa.bbb" (and Alonso's "c" and "d") seem to be an attempt to formulate an adequate theory of quantification, which was first achieved by G. Frege. 40 The "maze of the words 'begins' and 'ends'" are interesting variations of tense operators.
41
Mercado refused to treat some topics others covered. Tense belongs to natural philosophy, he said, and questions about whether mental propositions are simple or complex belong to philosophical psycho- 2001). "Quid sunt machinationes illae quas veris dialecticae institutis commiscere sophistissimi solent, veluti hoc immensum chaos quod excogitarunt, cumulantes literarum commentitias rapsodias 'aaa.bbb', insolubilium ac reflexivarum laqueos inenodabiles, nisi centauri et centimani gyges verique cyclopes et laestrigones qui majorem stragem in mentibus edunt quam haec portentosa monstra facerent damni si natura illa procreasset?" (p. 2). "Et quis praeceptorum et inter legendum cum discipulis dictata tribuit non cachino suscipit tot literarum portenta, quae ob nostram solum cogitationem terminorum suppositionem invertunt resolutionemque perturbant, et horum signorum 'uterque', 'alter', 'neuter' variam multiplicemque acceptionem maximo risu non diffudit." (p. 4). Quantifying over two objects suggests a square of opposition showing De Morgan relations:
x and y neither x nor y (not: x or y) x or y not x or not y (not: x and y).
logy. 42 He omitted problems of philosophy of religion such as whether "being" applies both to God and creatures and "thousands" of metaphysical ones, for example on categorizing intentional entities. 43 He did not deny the importance of these issues; his point was that if they belonged to formal logic they were too complicated for beginners, and if they did not, students were not even to "get a whiff" of them.
44
His misgivings about analyzing language logically sound familiar today. For their object language (the items analyzed logically), Scholastic logicians developed a somewhat artificial Latin, sometimes misunderstood as "barbaric". Some systems of logic that explicitly incorporate the vagueness of how people think and speak have recently been advocated. But logicians (like Rubio and Celis, as we shall see) generally rejected psychologism and nominalism, and Mercado spoke of the futility of trying to find precision in "ordinary" thought and discourse. Logic is hard to learn, he said, because of "[...] the many rules and classifications and, frankly, their uncertainty. For most are based on our ordinary way of thinking and speaking that cannot help but be ambiguous and sometimes capricious, and so they often wobble and threaten to collapse. But those who try -and many try tirelessly -to shore up their rules [...] must obscure their teaching by bringing in countless rickety distinctions, allowing many exceptions [...], and piling up answers to powerful objections to their rules that hardly do them justice". 45 
364
Walter Redmond 42 "Primum quod evellendum sese obtulit, mentalium conceptionum tractatus est in primo volumine intempestative digestus". (p. 4). "Et eadem methodo universas quaestiones huic rei pendulas subterfugimus. Nempe: an in mente ultimata aequivocatio inveniatur, ibidemve actus dentur syncathegorematici, utrum uno eodemque conceptu et obliquus et rectus casus percipiantur, sitne mentalis propositio simplex an composita qualitas, cum aliis inumeris perceptu difficillimis, nimium confusis et parum etiamsi intellegeris conducibilibus". (p. 5).
43 "In libro primo ventilant an 'Deus' sit terminus increatus et numquid 'ens' conceptum dicat communem Deo et creaturis, sitne Christus nobiscum univoce homo. Quaestiones ex abditissimis theologiae locis intempestative satis erutae. Ex metaphysica has et similes mille discutiunt, nempe: divisio entis in decem praedicamenta qualis sit, et in sensibus exterioribus si notitia formetur, denturne in rerum natura intentionales species, et in quo genere ad eliciendas noticias concurrant, propterea quod Augustinus dicat ex objecto et potentia pari notitiam. Quin imo libros De anima integros apud veteres philosophos difficillimos habitos hic commentantur, dum de omni conceptu mentis atque noticia disputant". (Second prologue, 1vA) .
44 "Quae sicuti extra hujus artis limites commorantur, ita erant silentio contegendae, ut juvenes illas nec olfacerent quidem". (Second prologue, 1vA) .
45 "Primo animadverto hanc logicam, praesertim parvam (quam 'summulas' neoterici appellant), non esse captu admodum facilem, quin forsan non nihilum difficilem, tum Balance in all this was important for Friar Tomás. He vowed to avoid oversimplification and superficiality as well as unnecessary complexity and irrelevance. He knew it was the fashion to accuse logicians of abstruseness, but he did not think anyone had yet come up with the right prescription.
46 Some indeed rushed to the opposite extreme and "dumbed down" their courses: their rules were simplistic, their definitions and classifications skimpy; and worse, they forsook the Scholastic custom of letting students take part in the debate "behind the rules". 47 Omitting polemic, said Mercado, thwarts the purpose of logic, for if the logician does not argue for his claims and deal with criticism against them, he cannot do his job -showing how to argue in "other" areas. Indeed, stripped of background discussion, logic cannot even teach itself. 48 Practice is especially important in logic, he thought, since logic is concerned less with its own object ("a tiny entity, after 365 Self-Awareness in Colonial Latin American Philosophy regularum et divisionum multitudine cum earundum (ut libere loquar) incertitudine, utpote quarum pleraeque communi modo concipiendi atque loquendi dumtaxat innituntur, qui non potest non esse anceps et quandoque varius, ac proinde titubare illas non nunquam ac veluti ruinam minari. Qui vero stabiles ac firmes eas reddere, ipsarum natura reclamante, conantur (et conantur indefesse plurimi), necesse est in disciplinam condensas tenebras inducant, innumeris distinctionibus futilibus ac lapsantibus utendo, plurimas exceptiones admittendo, cum intra proprios artis cancellos tot regulae ac distinctiones traditae sint ut conduceret plurimum in minorem numerum (si fieri posset) redigerentur, et argumentis in regulas efficacibus objectis solutiones aggregando vix argumenta solventes". (Second prologue, 1rB).
46 "Quae universa mala etsi omnes lugeamus, nemo hactenums illis tulit opem, nemo medicinam attulit". (p. 2). "Quid de aliis dicam plurimis veritati tam aperte reclamantibus et claritati tantopere inimicis, ut nemo eorum qui hoc tempore stilo indulgent non ingenue fateantur male se similia non scribere quam illa describere. [...] all") than with getting students to think out rules previewing argumentation in other fields. 
Antonio Rubio 50
Rubio became a Jesuit after studying philosophy at the University of Alcalá and was soon sent to Mexico, where he taught philosophy for four years and theology for twelve. 51 In the last decade of the 16th century, he wrote the bulk of his five works on philosophy, one on logic and four on natural philosophy, and in 1600 he returned to Europe to see them through the press. 52 He never returned to America since his General Superior in Rome thought he could "practice his letters" better in Spain than in Mexico, "especially since he is said to be so keen on St. Thomas which at the present time is a most important consideration". 53 At the end of the 16th century, there was indeed a shift not only back to Aristotle but to Aquinas as well. Rubio's confrères awaiting his "happy return" in Mexico were disappointed at this decision; for their commitment to America meant "leaving everything behind" -including Europe.
54
Rubio was an ambitious man; he set out to write the official philosophy textbooks for the University of Alcalá, a complete "course".
55
His metaphysics was never published (perhaps displaced by F. Suárez's Disputationes metaphysicae) and his dialectics lacks formal logic.
56
But his expectations were met on the whole: his logic became the official textbook of the University of Alcalá and he himself was named its "own author". We may actually speak of a "Rubio vogue" in the first quarter of the 17th century. His works were published over fifty times in eight European countries between 1603 and 1641; his logic went through 18 editions (in seven it was dubbed "the Mexican Logic").
Apparently, the logical "Golden Age" of streamlined logic teaching was over for Rubio. Professors and students in Alcalá revolted against his textbook, alleging that it was "longer than the ancient custom of the university would allow". 57 After some altercation, it took a royal decree to ensure its continued use. Rubio gave in gracefully and made 367 Self-Awareness in Colonial Latin American Philosophy 54 The Mexican Superior asked the General not to retain those sent from America on Order business: "sabiéndose estar ya la puerta cerrada, se quite la ocasión de lo contrario y se estorben los muchos daños que de ello se seguirían". Redmond, "La Lógica" (note 51 Priori Analysi speciali tractatu elucidare, cum in ipsamet dialecticae introductione (quam 'summularum' nomine intelligunt) juxta oblatam occasionem satisfuerint pertractati; Topicos vero locos rhetoricae considerationis esse quis non videat? Satis ergo esse duximus libros omnes dialecticae in scholis explicari solitos nostris commentariis illustrare, ut proinde universa Aristotelis dialctica tibi tradita a nobis jure optimo censeatur". (LP, n.pag.).
57 "Cum autem ejusdem Academiae viri gravissimi pariter et doctissimi, quibus me multis nominibus devinctum fateor, Commentarios nostros uberius protractos quam in eadem Universitate inveteratus ferret usus viderent, gratum pariter ac utile fore arbitrabantur, si eosdem Commentarios in compendium redactos, non sine multorum id jam dudum expetentium acclamatione, iterum proferrem. Cum ergo communis boni studio tenerentur accensi et id a me iterum ac saepius postularent, eorum praeceptis parendum omnino fuit, quorum auctoritas apud me plurimum valens, ad alia properantem animum,extemplo ad hunc laborem suscipiendum convertit. Suscepi sane et qua potui diligentia perfeci. Habetis jam, viri gravissimi, compendium hoc, nihilo magis ferme nostrum omnino vestrum, re quidem exiguum, placendi studio maximum". ("Florentissimae totoque orbe celeberrimae Academiae Complutensi"). a drastic abridgment for his "young students, who had long been requesting, nay demanding" it. 58 Rubio wanted a career in "letters" and said he never asked to be sent to America. After enduring in Mexico for four years teaching philosophy, he inquired discreetly about returning to Spain. Some of his superiors were alarmed at what they saw as discontent. He was also accused of reluctance to learn the Nahuatl language, and the Jesuit General in Rome enjoined upon him "a greater desire to help the Indians". 59 Rubio protested that he wished to return to Europe only because there, "with the letters that Our Lord gave me", he thought he could better serve God and Order. 60 He sent the General a feisty apologia:
"This I can truthfully say: the bit of work I do in reading and studying I do with much more satisfaction in this land [Mexico] , since here I serve the language ministry and the Natives, than if I did it in Spain or Rome, where it would not have this immediate effect".
61
Some time later we hear that he was already hearing confessions in Nahuatl.
62
Like Vera Cruz and Mercado, Rubio's worries were pedagogical, unrelated to America. He explained his reasons for undertaking his publication project. After a quarter century of teaching theology he "became a boy again" by returning to philosophy. His students and textbooks to be a "storehouse" containing all the contributions of philosophers past and present that masters and students would need in their courses. 67 But what if the professor did not agree with Rubio's opinions? His answer shows his extraordinary self-confidence: "Any teacher who uses our works will easily cover all of philosophy without dictating anything [of his own], for if he runs across something he disagrees withseldom, actually, if he is a true follower of Aristotle and St. Thomas -he can rebut it in class and argue for his own view -for what student is so slow that he cannot grasp these few, rarely occurring points without a book?" 68 A further motive had to do with this "dictating". By using his texts, he said, students avoid the tedium of taking notes in class and later transcribing them. Dictating was common "in almost all universities" because either ambitious teachers wanted to bequeath their ideas to posterity or lazy students heeded only what they heard in class.
69 Notetaking hurts the learning process because it cuts out debate, he said, again echoing Mercado -philosophers of old did not worry about writing things down; they were free to listen and argue. As it was, students were "[...] loaded down with their notebooks wherein they keep practically all their knowledge, while universities seem to be graduating secretaries rather than competent logicians and philosophers".
70
But with Rubio's manuals, students can forget quill and paper. They will hear the lectures "without yawning", carry on lively discussions among themselves, defending, attacking and so forth.
71
In Spain, Rubio made one more revision of his logic. He used the notion of the "objective concept", current at the end of the 16th century, to oppose nominalism and psychologism: the primary object of logic is neither words nor mental concepts and processes, he said, but what language and thought signify. 
